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The University in a Pluralistic Society 
Marc D. Guerra, Assumption College 
John Courtney Murray, S.J., was not the first 20th century thinker to 
observe that the modern university contributes to the erosion of those 
social and political institutions that have traditionally helped sustain 
American democracy. Similar claims were made earlier in the centu-
ry by Eric Voegelin, Leo Strauss, and Russell Kirk. As the unprece-
dented and unexpected success of Allan Bloom's Closing of the 
American Mind (and, to a lesser degree, E. D. Hirsch's Cultural 
Literacy) later showed, voicing such concerns became something of a 
cottage industry by the century's end. However, what sets Murray's 
argument apart from these others is that he approaches this problem 
from the perspective of America's democratic experience with reli-
gious pluralism and the effects this has had on the health and sustain-
ability of what Murray called the "American Proposition." 
By institutionalizing the practice of religious pluralism, American 
democracy formed something of an intellectual and political para-
dox. The existence of religious pluralism draws attention to the var-
ious disagreements religious Americans have about "the nature and 
destiny of man within a universe that stands under the reign of 
God." 1 Yet these substantive disagreements come to sight within a 
civil society that is itself bound together by a "public consensus" 
about the nature of human beings and human freedom. That the 
question of the theoretical grounds of the practice of religious plural-
ism admits of no easy and readymade solution undoubtedly explains 
"why it is so seldom asked" in our contemporary universities, 
according to Murray.2 
Murray goes out of his way to make clear that the university, 
even within a democratic society, does not exist for the sake of main-
taining a healthy, pluralist civil society. While having discernible 
moral and political implications, the university's goal transcends the 
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legitimate but limited concerns of political life. Most fundamentally, 
the university qua university "is committed to the task of putting an 
end to prejudice based on ignorance. "3 It is that "social institution 
whose function it is to bring the resources of reason and intelligence 
to bear, through all the disciplines of learning and teaching, on the 
problems of truth and understanding that confront society because 
they confront the mind of man himself. "4 To be sure, the university 
is limited in its ability to achieve its lofty goals. Its end is "not at all 
messianic."5 But when called upon to justify its place within civil 
society, the university can respond that it indirectly aids the political 
order by banishing, "as far as it can," false prejudices about the true 
nature and end of human life. 6 In so doing, it becomes an ally and 
defender of genuine freedom. To the extent it helps replace unfound-
ed opinion with knowledge of the truth, the university occupies a 
privileged place in American society, a place where citizens, individu-
ally and collectively, enjoy the "freedom to learn - to explore" what 
it means to be a human being.7 In this politically high-minded way 
the university fulfills an indirect but indispensable role in American 
democracy. 
Theoretically, the modern university and the problem of plural-
ism convergence on the same question: "What is man?"8 Not coinci-
dentally, this is also modernity's essential question. It is the question 
from which "all others proliferate" and to which eventually "all 
return" in modernity9 But it cannot be framed in narrowly anthro-
pocentric terms. To understand who and what man is, one has to 
wonder about his place in the universe. Such a line of inquiry requires 
one to engage the most serious and authoritative claims about human 
beings and the whole, including, paradoxically, the "skeptic or agnos-
tic view" that asserts it is "useless or illegitimate even to ask Ultimate 
Questions." 10 For this reason, the university is obliged to examine the 
responses revealed religions give to this question. They too claim to 
have an answer to the question about man. In fact, they claim to have 
the definitive answer to this "basic" question. If the university is to 
take its purpose seriously, it eventually finds itself caught up in "the 
characteristically modern situation of religious conflict" - albeit a 
conflict formed not by outward religious or civil strife but by the kind 
of rigorous intellectual debate that ought to define the life of the uni-
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1: versity.11 To flee from this situation would constitute "a flight from 
reality," an unfounded and willful attempt to deny the university's 
"spiritual and intellectual situation" in the modern pluralistic world 
·.in which it finds itself.12 
At this point, some of the political implications Murray attributes 
· to the university begin to come into focus. For the public consensus 
that lies at the heart of the American Proposition claims to be based 
, on a true account of the nature of man and a just and decent civil 
society. 13 In Murray's view, that consensus can be truthfully main-
. tained only by recourse to a "theory of natural law" that offers "an 
. account of the public moral experience" embodied in the American 
Proposition.14 Affirming the moral and intellectual legitimacy of the 
basic equality of all men, the right to religious freedom, the belief that 
government must respect the consent of the governed, and the claim 
men are endowed by the Creator with rights that limit the just exer-
. cise of popular sovereignty, the natural law theory that undergirds the 
American Proposition presupposes - and as Murray admits, stands or 
falls on - a coherent and valid "realist epistemology." 15 Putting such 
an epistemology to the test, Murray insists, ought to be a regular 
activity in the intellectual and spiritual life of the modern American 
university. 
Murray famously argued that the intellectual affirmation of nat-
ural law theory and its corresponding realist epistemology form part 
of America's (and more broadly Western civilization's) classical and 
Christian "patrimony. "16 That patrimony cannot be sustained by 
pietistic veneration of this inheritance simply because it is our own. 
Nor should it be. There are many things we inherit - customs, preju-
dices, old cars - whose veneration and transmission may not be jus-
tified in the bright light of day. Whether the natural law theory and 
epistemology operative in the American Proposition deserves to be 
sustained rests on whether the claims they make "are true. " 17 Murray 
believes they are, whether the Founders fully recognized this fact or 
not. Providentially, "the American political community was organ-
ized in an era when the tradition of natural law and natural rights 
was still vigorous." 18 That tradition was invoked to bring a new and 
unprecedented kind of political order into existence. Its acceptance 
therefore could not have depended on the pious veneration of a 
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preexisting civic order. Quite the contrary, it had to elicit the assent 
of "free minds. " 19 
Murray forthrightly acknowledges that the stability of America's 
public consensus has been imperiled from the country's beginning. In 
their writings, the Founders oscillated between rooting the American 
Proposition in two outwardly similar but inwardly dissimilar notions 
of natural law. According to Murray, one of these conceptions 
worked within a natural law tradition that originated in the works of 
classical philosophy, blossomed in the writings of St. Thomas 
Aquinas, and eventually became woven into the "Western classical 
and Christian tradition." But in their more rationalistic, i.e., more 
Lockean, formulations, Founders such as Jefferson routinely 
obscured human freedom's constitutive relation to "transcendent 
truth." Appealing to theories that claimed that human beings origi-
nally existed autonomously in a premoral and prepolitical state of 
nature, such formulations invoked a "philosophically shallow" law 
of nature.20 The coexistence of these dueling theoretical notions of 
natural law reveals a fundamental tension at the heart of the 
American Founding between a "voluntarist idea of law as will" and 
a "tradition of natural law as inheritance . . . an intellectualist 
idea. "21 The problem of radical autonomy or liberty severed from 
any end, Murray insists, is not a late edition to or innovation in 
America's democratic life. It was a "possibility ... inherent from the 
beginning." 22 
Murray was not the first Catholic thinker to recognize this theo-
retical tension at the heart of the American Founding. That point had 
been made in the nineteenth century by the Catholic political thinker 
Orestes Brownson. Brownson called attention to the dissimilarities 
between the moral and political demands of what he called America's 
providential constitution and those he identified with the Jeffersonian 
idea of democracy. In The American Republic (1866), he argued that 
America like every nation is endowed with a particular providential 
constitution. Such a constitution exists prior to and is more funda-
mental than any written constitution; it shapes and informs the life of 
the American people. "The constitution of the state, or the people of 
the state, is, in its origin at least, providential, given by God himself, 
operating through historical events or natural causes. "23 Working 
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within the parameters set by human nature and the moral, social, and 
intellectual history the American people hold in common, this consti-
tution binds citizens together and limits what is possible for citizens 
and statesmen within American political life. Brownson contrasted 
this view of American democracy with those of the "so-called 
Jeffersonian democracy. "24 Emphasizing the sovereignty of the indi-
vidual, this view claims that "government has no powers but such as 
it derives from the consent of the governed."25 Taken on its own 
terms and drawn to its logical conclusion, Jeffersonian democracy, 
according to Brownson, culminates in "pure individualism - philo-
sophically considered, pure egoism, which says, 'I am God."'26 
Moreover, two years before Murray published We Hold These 
Truths, Raymond-Leopold Bruckberger, O.P., made similar observa-
tions in his Images of America (1958). Bruckberger noted the pro-
found differences between Jefferson's draft of the Declaration of 
Independence and the final version of that document as voted by 
Congress. In his view, there was "no doubt ... that Congress and 
Jefferson had different concepts of God. "27 Jefferson's famed refer-
ence to "Nature's God," Bruckberger observes, "did not commit him 
to much."28 It deliberately remained "as vaguely defined as possi-
ble."29 In particular, Jefferson carefully steered clear of any reference 
to God "as personal and distinct from nature; as Creator, Providence, 
and Judge."30 By contrast, the majority of the members of Congress 
remained in the intellectual "tradition of the first New England 
Puritans."31 They were men who "had read the Bible and ... believed 
~ in it."32 The irreducible theoretical differences between Jefferson's 
and Congress's understandings of God, Bruckberger maintains, 
nonetheless had positive political effects on the American regime: 
The greatest luck of all for the Declaration was precisely the 
divergence and the comprise between the puritan tradition 
and what Jefferson wrote. Had the Declaration been written 
in the strictly Puritan tradition it would probably not have 
managed to avoid an aftertaste of theocracy and religious 
fanaticism. Had it been written from the standpoint of the lax 
philosophy of the day, it would have been a-religious, if not 
actually offensive to Christians. 33 
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While Brownson and Bruckberger traced Jefferson's libertarian 
natural rights teaching back to the writings of early modern political 
philosophers, Murray traces it back to the nominalism propounded 
by late medieval thinkers such as Duns Scotus and William of 
Ockham. There are reasons to question the adequacy of Murray's 
genealogical analysis, however. It is less than clear that early modern 
philosophers like Machiavelli, Bacon, Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, 
and Locke were unwittingly or blindly drawing out the practical 
implications of the nominalist conceptions of reason they inherited 
from the decadent scholasticism of the late medieval period. Their 
writings suggest otherwise. Machiavelli's critique of imaginary 
republics, Descartes' criticism of the sandcastles ancient moral philos-
ophy erected, and Spinoza's disparagement of classical Utopias show 
that these thinkers self-consciously saw themselves as rejecting the 
forms of rationalism and republicanism that had informed the classi-
cal philosophic and Christian theological traditions and embracing 
new theoretical, empirical, and practical conceptions of reason that 
were, in their words, far less risky and utopian than their premodern 
counterparts. 
Be that as it may, Murray is right to note that the countervailing 
intellectualist notion of natural law that originally helped keep the 
Lockean idea of man as an autonomous individual in check has today 
fallen into disrepute. Our problem is not simply that the voluntaris-
tic view of natural law has gained moral and political legitimacy. It 
runs deeper. The belief that there are universal truths about man and 
morality that human reason can know is now routinely called into 
question. 34 Accordingly, we "face a crisis that is new in history. "35 At 
its core, this crisis stems from late modern rationalism's denial of any 
metaphysical or transhistorical principles that could help men make 
sense of their current situation. When translated into the language of 
political life, the denial of these principles eviscerates the moral and 
political claims embodied in the American Proposition in "one 
stroke." 36 At the time of the American Founding, the truth of the 
Declaration's self-evident claims was thought to be able to win the 
day once "subjected to the unbridled competition of the market place 
of ideas." In late modernity, "it is no longer possible to cherish this 
naivete. "37 
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That contemporary intellectuals no longer share the 
Enlightenment's faith in reason's unbridled explanatory powers, in 
Murray's judgment, reveals that we have in the decisive respect 
- "reached the end of the era that it gave itself the qualification 'mod-
1 ern."' 38 As such, we have entered a "post-modern" era. 
Postmodernism's morally, intellectually, and spiritually "debilitat-
ing" doctrine is now the dominant view in America's universities. 
The university both suffers from and contributes to late modern 
man's experience of "disenchantment. " 39 Dogmatically committed 
to academically fashionable doctrines, our universities wittingly and 
unwittingly contribute to the "decay of political intelligence" and to 
the "loss of confidence in the power of reason to fix the purposes of 
political life and to direct the energies of freedom in such a way as 
to impose a due measure of human control upon the forces of histo-
ry."40 
Murray is quick to point out that the nihilistic and relativistic 
doctrines students are likely to be indoctrinated with are not pro-
pounded by philosophers, or even sophists who pose as philosophers. 
They are disseminated by what Murray refers to in his short book 
The Problem of God as "the godless man of the Theatre."41 The 
appearance of this "Post-modern" type is something new.42 The god-
less man of the Theatre is not so much genuinely post-modern but 
hyper-modern. Like his early modern predecessors, he desires to 
exorcise any residual faith that human beings may have in what 
Hobbes characterized as powers unseen. But unlike his early modern 
predecessors, he does not believe that reason is (or ever could be) our 
true star and compass. For him, the claim that reason can know the 
truth about man and the universe is one of the ghosts that must be 
exorcised from late modern man's consciousness. In this respect, the 
godless man of the Theatre exhibits "continuity amid difference. "43 
As his title suggests, the godless man of the Theatre is essentially an 
"actor." In sharp contrast to the classical philosophers, and to a less-
er extent the early modern philosophers, he is not moved by philoso-
phy. In fact, he denies that eras can be directed towards a love of wis-
dom. Caring "nothing for metaphysics or epistemology, "44 he views 
himself as a phenomenologist, artfully and entertainingly describing 
"the situation" of man. That situation is marked by the claim that 
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man has no nature. He has only a presence, "an actual 'being-there-
in-the-moment' in action and freedom. "45 The godless man of the 
Theater acknowledges only the presenting "fact." One imagines that 
to such a man Google comes as close as one can to a god: Ask Google 
a question and it renders the sterile, free-standing answer right before 
your eyes. 
Given the self-imposed strictures he places on his descriptive 
powers, when speaking to other human beings the godless man of the 
Theatre is prone to appeal to "the public imagination, common 
impressions, generally shared feelings about things. "46 He uses these 
emotional appeals as vehicles for his own ideas.47 Both playwright 
and actor, he performs in a project of his own creation in the hope 
that this will allow him to exist undisturbed in a world he believes is 
absurd. Any other life, he asserts, is destined to be crippled by a sense 
of "anguish and anxiety. "48 The godless man of the Theatre does not 
desire to exercise overt rule over his fellow human beings - in this, 
according to Murray, he differs markedly from the "godless man of 
the communist world revolution." But he does seek to exercise indi-
rect rule over his fellow human beings insofar as he wishes to abreast 
them of the utterly chaotic nature of human life and the universe. His 
form of rule accordingly provides a model, not the model, for other 
human beings. 
As Murray presents him, the godless man of the Theatre ulti-
mately sets forth two lessons: 1) the alleged pluripotent character of 
human existence and, 2) the alleged independence of human freedom 
from any external and transcendent limit and restraint. 49 He preach-
es that each man can, and must, become the '"inventor of himself' (in 
Sartre's phrase)."50 Only through the act of self-creation can one 
become a free and unique "individual."51 Such a radical act unmasks 
the true power of man and the futility of believing that human beings 
can hold social and political life in common. Whereas political life 
requires citizens to recognize both their interconnection and depend-
ence on each other, being an individual demands that one assumes 
"single and full obligation" for his own existence. The self-creating 
individual makes a fundamental and "original choice to be-for-him-
self." Disavowing any connection or indebtedness to any other 
human being, he bears "the entire responsibility" for himself and his 
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world. 52 Rejecting all metaphysical and teleological claims, the god-
less man of the Theatre radicalizes the problem of religious pluralism 
by asserting that each human being is and ought to be his own 
Creator-God. 
Against this backdrop, Murray proposes that our universities 
reclaim something of their natural purpose by subjecting the claims 
the Western revealed religions make about human beings, the uni-
verse, and God to serious, academic examination. Murray does not 
propose that the modern university assume the implausible role the 
Republic ironically assigns to the philosopher-king. The university, 
like the professors and students that populate it, is constitutionally 
incapable of demonstrating the truth of a revealed religion, let alone 
ordering civil society around such a demonstration. 53 It therefore 
must resist the temptation to "reduce modern pluralism to unity."54 
But it can and should seek to elucidate the claims about the nature 
and end of human life that revealed religions make. And it should be 
able to say something about how reasonable these claims actually 
are. 
One of the striking features of Murray's proposal is that it sug-
gests that this kind of investigation should begin by reflecting on the 
content and demands of natural law and not by engaging in unmis-
takably metaphysical or theological reflections. But as Murray makes 
clear, serious natural law reflections are neither narrowly moral and 
political nor constrictively positivistic or reductionistic. Rather, even-
tually they require one to "opt ... for a metaphysic of right."55 
Whether deliberate or not, Murray's argument at times exaggerates 
what natural law reflections actually allow us to know about the 
nature of man and the moral universe. Illustrative of this tendency is 
his under-qualified remark that through the natural law our "intelli-
gence" is capable of discovering the true "nature of things."56 
Murray remains on safer theoretical grounds when claiming that 
natural law theory requires the affirmation of a God "Who is eternal 
reason, Nous, ... [and] the summit of the order of being. "57 Absent 
the recognition of that God, natural law theory is in the end unten-
able. 58 Contrary to a number of 20th century Catholic and non-
Catholic proponents of natural law theory, Murray rejects the claim 
that one can deny the existence of God and still maintain that 
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natural law coherently articulates the natural ends to which human 
freedom is ordered. Taken on its own terms and drawn to its logic 
conclusion, such a denial would require us to claim along with Kant 
that nature and human freedom are permanently at odds with each 
other, or to say that physical or biological necessity mechanistically 
governs most (maybe even all) of embodied human life. Murray thus 
rejects those arguments that claim that natural law theory is inherent-
ly biological and reductionist. In his judgment, they perpetuate "a 
particularly gross and gratuitous misrepresentation, since nothing is 
clearer in natural-law theory than its identification of the 'natural' 
with the 'rational,' or perhaps better, the 'human.' Its whole effort is 
to incorporate the biological values in man, notably his sexual ten-
dencies, into the fuller human order of reason, and to deny them the 
status of the primordial. The primordial in man - that which is first 
in order - is his rational soul ... which informs all that is biological 
in him. "59 To affirm the existence of natural law is to affirm that 
human freedom is ennobling precisely because it is freedom under 
God. To think otherwise, Murray concludes, is itself unreasonable. 
In making this claim, Murray sides with natural law theorists 
such as Yves Simon over and against new-fangled natural law 
thinkers like John Finnis and Germain Grisez.60 In a way analogous 
to Murray, Simon emphasized the connection between the existence 
of God and the knowledge of morality man gains through the natu-
ral law. Simon affirmed a connection between the knowledge of 
morality human beings gain through the natural law and the kind of 
metaphysical knowledge of a God that renders all of reality, includ-
ing moral reality, intelligible. Human beings' knowledge of the natu-
ral law provides them access to incomplete but authentic knowledge 
about the eternal law and, ultimately, about its author, God; to affirm 
that a particular moral or political arrangement is just or unjust 
inevitably requires one to appeal to a metaphysical and theocentric 
order that can support such a claim. On this point, Murray funda-
mentally agrees with Simon's claim that "the understanding of natu-
ral law can be logically preserved" without acknowledging God as 
"the ultimate foundation of all laws. "61 
Because revealed religions give substantively different accounts of 
the nature and purpose of human freedom, they provide the natural 
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law theorist with an opportunity to reflect upon the concrete impli-
cations these differences have on the problem of religious pluralism. 
Who and what does Judaism claim man is? What is the end or ends 
of human life, according to Catholicism? What is human freedom 
grounded in according to Protestantism and what does Reformed 
Christianity say proximately and remotely informs this freedom? In 
the final analysis, these questions point well beyond the parameters 
of even the most robust and expansive theory of natural law. But they 
are questions whose initial terms and categories - Is man like every 
other animal? Is he ordered to some form of transcendence? Is the 
end of human freedom capable of being grasped by the natural light 
of reason and, if so to, what degree? - are not wholly foreign to nat-
ural law theory. In this respect, Murray argues, natural law theory 
shares with Judaism, Protestantism, and Catholicism the "reasonable 
belief" that human beings are finite beings intrinsically ordered and 
extrinsically guided to a truth not of their making. 
The natural law theorist's reflections on the problem of religious 
pluralism reveal a limited but important truth about the nature of 
human beings and human freedom. While incapable of judging which 
religion is the true religion, they can show how the moral teachings 
of various revealed religions comport to what reason naturally knows 
about the demands of justice and the natural virtue of religion. 
Contrary to the claims of radical libertarianism, such knowledge 
reminds democratic citizens that freedom, including the freedom to 
choose one's religion, is constitutionally incapable of being an end in 
itself. It points to the fact that freedom is a qualified good that nec-
essarily needs to be tethered to a transcendent order of truth if it is to 
be coherently defended. Practiced in this way, natural law investiga-
tions "could make some contribution to ... the reduction of modern 
pluralism to intelligibility. " 62 For this reason, Murray argues, they 
could help secular and religious universities form true citizens of the 
academy and indirectly help form citizens fitted for a country that is 
marked by its long experience of religious pluralism. 
It must be noted that two formidable obstacles to Murray's pro-
posal have arisen since the time he framed his argument about the 
role of the university in a pluralist society. The first concerns the cal-
iber of academic theological dispute that is capable of occurring in 
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contemporary American universities. Murray's proposal presupposes 
the availability of a substantial number of professors within the uni-
versity who have "an understanding of the nature of religious 
faith. "63 At a minimum, such professors must possess knowledge of 
their faith's doctrinal claims. But they must also know (and be able 
to explain) what their faith means when it affirms that a given doc-
trine is true. To illustrate his point, Murray calls attention to the 
"radical disagreement" that has historically existed between 
Catholicism and Protestantism on the precise nature of theological 
doctrine. For in systematically expressing its doctrinal claims, 
Catholic theology traditionally stresses the harmony between faith 
and reason and hence the reasonable character of doctrinal formula-
tions far more than its Protestant counterpart. 
But as Pope John Paul II emphasized in his encyclical letter Fides 
et Ratio and Pope Benedict XVI stressed in his Regensburg lecture 
"Faith, Reason, and University," today the theoretical principles 
behind such traditional Catholic and Protestant theological disagree-
ments are apt to go unnoticed. Working within modern science's and 
modern philosophy's reductionistic accounts of the scope of human 
reason, Catholic academics routinely deemphasize the reasonable 
character of their faith. In our dehellenized age, an increasing num-
ber of Catholic academic theologians - ranging from those who 
advocate theological eclecticism to some of those who advocate a 
return to "radical orthodoxy" - present theology not as a speculative 
science but as a form of postmodern fideism. In their writings, post-
modern theory is portrayed not so much as a form of irrationalism 
that undercuts the distinctive claim to reason Catholicism tradition-
ally makes, but as a doctrine that offers the religion a new sense of 
legitimacy in a world in which every claim to truth is said to rest on 
a faith-filled commitment. Murray's proposal proved to be far too 
optimistic, if not somewhat naive. At the very least, it seriously mis-
judged the majority of Catholic academicians' ability to protect 
themselves from the intellectual deformations that typically plague 
the late modern mind. 
The other obstacle concerns the further disrepute natural law 
theory has fallen into since Murray wrote We Hold These Truths. 
Murray knew that in 1960 natural law theory was most likely to 
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find a home in outposts within America's Catholic community. 
These outposts have only grown smaller in the intervening years. To 
be sure, over the past several decades an increasing number of 
Catholic thinkers have found support for natural law arguments in 
Pope John Paul II's 1993 encyclical Veritatis Splendor. But the natu-
ral law theory presented there reflects John Paul's own mixture of 
natural law theory and phenomenological personalism more than it 
does the kind of natural law theory that Murray strenuously advo-
cated - or, for that matter, the natural law teaching Aquinas sets 
forth in his Summa Theologiae·. And as we have already noted, con-
temporary Catholic jurists and analytic theorists like Finnis and 
Grisez typically invoke natural law theories that have been trimmed 
of explicit metaphysical and teleological claims in the hope that such 
pruning will somehow make their theories more acceptable to the 
late modern mind. 
To be fair, the possible emergence of such obstacles was not whol-
ly unforeseen by Murray. For example, he admitted that while the 
contemporary "Protestant charcoal burner ... knows well enough 
that he differs from the Catholic charcoal burner, and vice versa ... 
it is not so certain that either of them could say why, in any articu-
late fashion. "64 What is more, Murray did not think that the exis-
tence of these obstacles was entirely lamentable. He wittily remarked 
that over the years the theory of natural law has been pronounced 
dead only later to come back to life more times than one can count . 
Part of the reason for this is that while natural law theory allows us 
to discover something true about morality, human freedom, and our-
selves this discovery needs to be articulated in a way that does justice 
to the nature of these things. Among other things, such a task 
requires us to have recourse to language that can truthfully explain 
how morality helps shape and inform human freedom and our abili-
ty to live a genuinely dignified human life. Developing this language 
(both inside and outside of our universities) in light of all that we can 
really know about the nature of nature, morality, human freedom, 
and the cosmos would undoubtedly help us bring about the latest 
installment in the eternal return of the natural law. And for this 
opportunity, Murray reminds us, the self-governing citizens of 
American democracy should be grateful. 
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